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BY PROF. JASON A. CADE

Moones Mellouli lawfully entered the United
States in 2004 on a student visa. He earned undergraduate and graduate degrees with distinction, taught
mathematics at the University of Missouri-Columbia,
became a lawful permanent resident (LPR) and got engaged to a U.S. citizen. In 2010, Mellouli pleaded guilty
to possession of a sock as drug paraphernalia in Kansas
state court, a misdemeanor offense. After he successfully completed probation in 2012, the federal immigration enforcement agency put him in deportation
proceedings pursuant to a statutory ground of removal
targeting controlled substance offenses. Ineligible for
discretionary adjudicative relief under current law,
Mellouli was deported. When his appeal finally reached
the Supreme Court in 2015, the justices reversed.1
The government’s deportation of Mellouli for possession of a sock, and the Court’s subsequent reversal
of the agency, reflect the remarkable transformation of
immigration law that has occurred in the United States
over the last two decades. This article discusses the shift
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from a deportation system that previously
allowed for more formal adjudicative-discretion to one in which state and federal
enforcement officials bear primary responsibility for assessing proportionality and
fairness through discretionary enforcement decisions regarding both lawfully and
unlawfully present noncitizens. That shift,
toward what I call enforcement-based equity, has exerted increasing influence on
executive branch actions in immigration
law as well as the U.S. Supreme Court’s
recent immigration jurisprudence.2

A Brief Primer on Deportation Law

In general, deportation rules target two
groups of noncitizens. One consists of
persons who are deportable on the basis of being present in the United States
without authorization. Another consists
of lawfully present noncitizens who become deportable after being convicted of
certain offenses or engaging in other prohibited behavior (e.g., unauthorized employment or unlawful voting). A deportation order signifies the formal ejection
of a noncitizen falling into one of these
groups from the United States. Generally
speaking, it is a civil legal determination,

In general, deportation rules target two
groups of noncitizens. One consists of
persons who are deportable on the basis
of being present in the United States
without authorization. Another consists
of lawfully present noncitizens who
become deportable after being convicted
of certain offenses or engaging in other
prohibited behavior (e.g., unauthorized
employment or unlawful voting).
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following an administrative proceeding,
that the noncitizen does not have a right
to remain in the country.
For much of immigration law’s history, immigration judges presiding over
deportation proceedings were statutorily
empowered to weigh a noncitizen’s positive and negative factors before entering
an order of removal.3 Where, on balance,
deportation would be overly harsh in
light of mitigating factors, immigration
judges often had the equitable discretion
to suspend or set it aside. Criminal law
judges, too, had the authority to issue a
sentencing “recommendation,” considered binding on federal authorities, that
deportation not follow from a criminal
conviction in light of the defendant’s individualized circumstances.4 Moreover,
for most of the 20th century criminal
history did not play a major role in determining the deportability of noncitizens.
Congress enacted the first criminal removal ground in 1917, for persons convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude,” but this applied only within the
first five years of the noncitizen’s entry
and only if a prison sentence of at least
one year was imposed.5 Over the years,
Congress gradually expanded the criminal offenses that would lead to deportation, but removal on the basis of criminal
history remained relatively rare—about 7
percent of all deportations.6
In the late 20th century, however,
Congress enacted a series of laws that
precipitated a dramatic shift in immigration law.7 Extensive revisions to the
immigration code made all unauthorized
presence a deportable offense (though
not a criminal infraction) and also significantly multiplied and broadened the
categories of criminal offenses triggering
deportation for lawful present noncitizens.8 Simultaneously, Congress drastically reduced the statutory authority for
immigration law judges and criminal
sentencing judges to make equitable determinations about the appropriateness
of deportation in individual cases. A few
discretionary forms of relief remain, but
they are exceedingly difficult to qualify
for.9 As a result, many criminal offenses
that are treated quite lightly under state
penal laws—for example, petty shoplift-
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The Rise of Enforcement-Based
Equity

Although immigration is a controversial
and frequently divisive topic, most would
agree that a deportation is a life-altering
event. To be sure, the severity will depend
on the particular situation of the affected
individual, but, generally speaking, few
civil penalties exceed the impact that banishment has for many noncitizens, as well
as their families and communities. The
removal of a noncitizen from the United
States commonly results in lengthy or
permanent separation from children and
spouse, significant economic hardship
and the possibility of harm in the country
of return. In the Supreme Court’s words,
“deportation may result in the loss of all
that makes life worth living.”13
On the other hand, immigration rules
are intended to further undoubtedly significant interests. Such goals include public safety and national security, economic
productivity (including the labor needs of
U.S. employers as well as the protection
of U.S. citizens’ and lawfully present immigrants’ economic interests), the prioritization of particular family relationships
and the capacity to extend humanitarian
relief to refugees and others. Deportation
controls are ostensibly intended to re-

move from American society those noncitizens who pose threats or shirk rules.
The central challenge of our deportation system is the balance of these competing concerns. On the one hand are a deportable noncitizen’s positive equities and
mitigating factors, including the strength
of family and community ties, the length
of residence in the United States, economic contributions, general moral character,
hardship or danger faced in the country of
return and so on. On the other hand are
the noncitizen’s transgressions, including
the nature and recency of any criminal activity or the frequency and egregiousness
of any immigration violations.
This concern, raised by any legal system that administers significant sanctions, reflects the principle of proportionality. Proportionality refers to the fit
between the gravity of the underlying offenses, tempered by any mitigating or exacerbating factors, and the severity of the
sanction.14 To be sure, there is no universal agreement about the point at which a
given penalty becomes disproportionate.
Nevertheless, most lawyers, scholars and
jurists accept that enforcers or enforcement systems should be sensitive to special cases and that at some point the gap
between the consequences of deportation
for an affected individual and the nature
of the underlying violations becomes too
wide, raising proportionality problems.
As discussed above, in the 1990s Congress dramatically widened the net of deportability while constraining back-end,
formal adjudicative discretion. Nevertheless, removing equitable discretionary authority from the purview of judges does
not necessarily excise all consideration
of fairness from the deportation system.
Instead, Congress’s expansion of deportability grounds and contraction of backend adjudicative equity may simply have
shifted power (and, some might argue,
responsibility) to police, prosecutors and
federal enforcers to evaluate proportionality concerns at the front-end stages of
the process.
This phenomenon has long been recognized in the criminal law field, where
one consequence of enacting broad, inflexible penal statutes and mandatory
sentencing guidelines is to transfer eq-

uitable power to law enforcement police
and prosecutors, who act as the criminal
system’s normative gatekeepers.15 Legislators have incentives to increase the
severity of penal laws, relying on police and prosecutors to exercise discretion in determining who to arrest and
prosecute, so that criminal law is appropriately and proportionally applied to
individual human beings. Discretion is
thus critical to temper and refine broad
criminal statutes.
Similarly, in the immigration context,
Congress’s expansion of the grounds for
removal, in conjunction with the narrowing of adjudicative discretionary authority, effectively (if not intentionally) transferred substantial gate-keeping power to
the deportation system’s enforcement
officials. Notably, when media accounts
began highlighting stories of the immigration agency’s indiscriminate enforcement against long-time lawful permanent
residents of the harsher statutory provisions enacted in 1996, many of the same
legislators who had voted for the revisions wrote a letter to the attorney general urging more systematic prosecutorial
discretion in order to avoid “unfair” deportations and “unjustifiable hardship.”16
Modern immigration law delegates
wide authority to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to determine
enforcement priorities.17 The vast number of potential enforcement targets is
also relevant. Even as laws and attitudes
about undocumented workers and immigration enforcement have become more
stringent, Congress’s budgetary appropriations in recent years to the Executive’s
immigration agencies permit the removal
of only a small fraction of the total number of noncitizens who may be deportable
on the basis of unlawful presence, criminal history or other infractions.18 Thus,
even as the Obama Administration actualized more than 2.5 million removals—
far more than any other administration in
history19—these were a drop in the bucket
relative to the size of the pool. This massive underfunding, coupled with the
breadth of modern deportation categories
and the constriction of back-end discretion, suggests that Congress depends on
the Executive to set priorities and exercise
2017 APRIL
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ing, turnstile jumping and minor marijuana possession offenses—now can trigger detention, deportation, and lengthy
or permanent bars on lawful return,
with little room for immigration judges
to balance equitable factors, even for
long-term LPRs.10 In fact, under current
law even convictions that have been fully
pardoned, expunged or entered but deferred pending completion of diversionary programs in many cases can continue
to result in immigration consequences.11
At the same time, the size of the population deportable on the basis of unlawful presence has grown to more than 11
million, two-thirds of whom apparently
have lived in the United States for over a
decade.12 The reach of modern deportation law is thus vast, with many millions
of foreign nationals in the United States
potentially subject to enforcement actions
despite longstanding community ties.

discretion when determining which percentage of the total removable population
to target. President Trump has indicated a
desire to increase deportations and detention above Obama’s numbers, and it remains to be seen whether Congress will
significantly increase the appropriations
necessary to do so.

Recent Efforts at EnforcementBased Equity in the Executive
Branch

Under President Obama, DHS endeavored to implement enforcement-based
equity in specific ways. I will highlight
two such efforts here. First, the Department of Homeland Security prioritized
enforcement against recent bordercrossers and noncitizens who encounter
criminal justice systems. Although not all
deportations of persons within these categories will be proportional, prioritizing
limited resources in this way does lessen
the likelihood of enforcement against
non-targeted groups, whom the government may believe are likely to present
more significant equitable claims. Noncitizens who have already been living in
the United States for some time, and who
have avoided contact with the criminal
justice system, are more likely to have developed ties and relationships that might
militate against removal.
As a result of this strategy, border removals under the Obama Administration
dramatically increased as a percentage of
overall removals—something on the order of 66 percent in recent years.20 Similarly, nearly half of recent deportees had
at least some kind of criminal history.21
As discussed below, the Supreme Court
appears to believe, as do many scholars
and advocates, that the executive branch’s
approach to the removal of noncitizens
with criminal history has been overly
coarse. And by and large, the vast majority of those whom DHS terms “criminal
aliens” have been convicted only of traffic offenses, low-level drug possession
or crimes of migration (illegal entry or
re-entry). Nevertheless, the Obama Administration’s focus on noncitizens who
encounter the criminal justice system—
which the Trump Administration has in20
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dicated it will continue to pursue—does
increase the likelihood that those put in
removal proceedings will have negative
factors justifying deportation.
Second, DHS in recent years has increased the use of prosecutorial discretion
in immigration enforcement, on both a
case-by-case level and more categorically.
In 2011, John Morton, then-director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), began the roll-out of a series of
agency initiatives aimed at encouraging
more systematic use of prosecutorial discretion. Through memoranda and trainings, agency leaders set out various positive and negative factors to be balanced
in the exercise of discretion. Over time
the agency tinkered with the criteria and
priorities, but the consistent focus was on
encouraging front-line operatives to target noncitizens with criminal history or
significant immigration violations, and to
consider forbearance in cases with compelling humanitarian factors.
These prosecutorial discretion initiatives met with significant resistance by
front-line operatives. In fact, one of ICE’s
unions sued the agency, and refused to
allow its 7,700 members to engage in
agency training on the use of prosecutorial discretion. ICE’s prosecutors—the
trial attorneys who represent the government in deportation proceedings—did not
engage in organized resistance, and over
time many increased their use of equitable discretion. But the results of these
efforts nationwide varied wildly, with a
small handful of immigration court jurisdictions representing the majority of discretionary case closures.22 Many similarly
situated jurisdictions saw dramatically
different closure rates.23
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), announced in 2012, represented the agency’s attempt to shift
toward more systematic and categorical
implementation of enforcement discretion. DACA focuses on one of the most
sympathetic groups of undocumented
noncitizens—longtime residents who
were brought to the United States at a
young age, demonstrate potential for
economic productivity and lack indicia
of dangerousness or wrong-doing. Such
individuals have been acculturated as

Americans and have little or no culpability in their immigration violations, thus
bringing the current system’s potential
for disproportionality into sharp relief.
Instead of the reactive, case-by-case approach of the earlier prosecutorial discretion initiatives, DACA encourages those
individuals who can meet the specified
criteria to announce themselves to the
agency for consideration for “deferred
action,” which amounts to a revocable assurance that the individual will not be a
priority for removal for a period of time.24
It is some indication of the highly sympathetic circumstances of DACA-eligible
noncitizens that the Trump Administration has decided not to end the program,
instead allowing recipients to retain deferred action until their grant periods expire. In other respects, the new administration is likely to change the enforcement
approach. In particular, DHS Secretary
John Kelly has issued new memoranda
that largely abandon the Obama-era prosecutorial discretion guidelines as agencywide policy. Consequently, the exercise of
discretion in individual cases currently is
in a phase of uncertainty and change.

Enforcement-Based Equity
in the Supreme Court

In recent years, the Supreme Court has
come to grips with this new reality of
enforcement-based equity in the deportation system. In fact, concerns about the
system’s potential for disproportionality appear to have influenced much of
the Court’s recent jurisprudence in this
area, although the Court likely is far from
recognizing a substantive proportionality principle. Here I will highlight a few
of the leading cases that appear to be
animated by the Court’s equity concerns
about the operation of the current removal and enforcement scheme.
Arizona v. United States

On June 22, 2012, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. United States, which clarified the federal government’s primacy in
the area of immigration enforcement, although preserving some room for state
activity.25 The Court struck down on
preemption grounds most of the chal-

lenged provisions of Arizona’s omnibus law, SB 1070, which essentially had
created a state-level branch of the federal immigration enforcement system.
For present purposes, most remarkable
about Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion is its direct acknowledgement that
equity in the deportation scheme today
depends almost entirely on the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion.
Justice Kennedy first explained that a
“principle feature of the removal system is
the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.”26 It is worthwhile to appreciate the clarity of the Court’s understanding—and endorsement—of the connection
between federal agencies’ exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the implementation of equity in the deportation system:
)HGHUDORƛƛLFLDOVDVDQLQLWLDOPDWWHUPXVW
decide whether it makes sense to pursue
removal at all. . . . Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns.
Unauthorized workers trying to support their families, for example, likely
pose less danger than alien smugglers or
aliens who commit a serious crime. The
equities of an individual case may turn
on many factors, including whether the
alien has children born in the United
States, long ties to the community, or a
record of distinguished military service
. . . . Returning an alien to his own country
may be deemed inappropriate even where
KH KDV FRPPLWWHG D UHPRYDEOH RƛIHQVH RU
fails to meet the criteria for admission.27
The Court in Arizona thus acknowledged that not all noncitizens made
deportable by Congress are similarly
situated, and that, as a result, executive
enforcement officials should weigh individual equities in determining the appropriateness of removal in particular cases.
This stark endorsement of the central role
of enforcement discretion in the modern
deportation scheme—including discretion
not to pursue persons who are formally
removable—set the stage for the Court’s
preemption analysis of the challenged
provisions of SB 1070. Throughout its
discussion, the Court’s analysis reflected
its concern that the challenged statutory
22
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provisions would enable state or local
authorities to negate the federal government’s determination not to penalize
certain removable individuals, whether
resulting from case-by-case evaluation or
macro-enforcement priorities.28
Padilla v. Kentucky

As described above, the Obama administration’s immigration enforcement agency
largely declined to differentiate among
so-called “criminal aliens,” treating almost
any kind of criminal history as an irrefutable signifier of undesirability. All indications are that the Trump administration
will take an even more expansive approach. Recent rulings, however, suggest
that overly aggressive enforcement of the
Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA)
criminal law provisions troubles the Court.
The justices’ discomfort with the inflexible operation and harsh consequences
of current deportation rules was perhaps
most apparent in its 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, which took the unusual
step of regulating an aspect of the removal
system through a constitutional criminal
procedure ruling.29 Relying on erroneous
advice from his attorney, Jose Padilla (a
long-time lawful permanent resident)
pled guilty to a criminal charge that all but
guaranteed his deportation. The Court’s
watershed holding in that case—that the
Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense counsel to render effective advice
about the potential immigration consequences of a conviction—was firmly
rooted in the new realities of federal immigration law, including the evisceration
of opportunities for leniency in the face of
criminal convictions.
The Court noted that for much of the
20th century the grounds of criminal
removal were narrow, and zeroed in on
the fact that “immigration reforms over
time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of
judges to alleviate the harsh consequences
of deportation.”30 Justice Stevens’ majority
opinion emphasized the more recent loss
of mitigating mechanisms at both federal
and state levels, which he described as
“critically important . . . to minimize the
risk of unjust deportation.”31 As a result,
“the drastic measure of deportation . . . is

now virtually inevitable for a vast number
of noncitizens convicted of crimes.”32
It would be constitutionally unfair,
the Court reasoned, to allow persons to
plead guilty without being aware that
the penalty of deportation would follow. Rooted in the Sixth Amendment’s
command that criminal defendants be
afforded adequate assistance of counsel,
the decision puts constitutional obligations only on criminal defense attorneys. Practically, however, the ruling
will pressure prosecutors and judges
to ensure that defense attorneys have
adequately advised their clients so that
convictions cannot later be undone on
ineffective assistance grounds. Recognizing that equitable discretion in the
removal system has shifted to earlier,
enforcement stages, Justice Stevens also
expressed the hope that the Court’s Sixth
Amendment ruling would encourage defense attorneys and prosecutors to take
immigration consequences into account
when engaging in plea bargaining.33
The Categorical Approach Cases

Padilla established a structure for noncitizen defendants to reach plea deals that
avoid deportation, or that preserve narrow possibilities for equitable discretionary relief in later deportation proceedings.
Another set of cases decided over the last
decade have worked toward the same objective by narrowing the range of criminal
convictions that trigger mandatory removal. For the most part, these decisions
have concerned noncitizens with minor
drug-related convictions that, while given
lenient treatment under state law, were
charged as “aggravated felony” deportation grounds by ICE prosecutors—a categorization that would foreclose any possibility of discretionary relief.34 The name
is something of a misnomer, as many
convictions falling within this category
are neither aggravated nor felonies.35 The
Court has rejected many of the governments’ overzealous efforts by requiring a
categorical match between the elements
of the criminal offense and the removal
ground.36 Through these rulings, the
Court has reigned in the harshest interpretations of the criminal removal provisions and safeguarded at least limited op-
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portunities for equitable decision-making
in deportation proceedings.
In Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, for example, the government argued that Carachuri-Rosendo’s two minor state-law drug
possession crimes would have made him a
felony recidivist drug offender under the
Controlled Substances Act, had he been
federally prosecuted, therefore constituting an aggravated felony.37 The Court
focused on the need to preserve prosecutorial discretion in the conviction-to-removal pipeline. Federal procedure allows
prosecutors to choose, in the exercise of
discretion, whether to seek a recidivist enhancement. Many state codes afford state
prosecutors similar discretion. The Court
found that allowing immigration judges
to apply their own recidivist enhancements “would denigrate the independent
judgment of state prosecutors.”38 In Carachuri-Rosendo’s own criminal case, the
prosecutor chose to abandon the recidivist
enhancement. One can only speculate on
the prosecutor’s motives for doing so, but
the Court’s ruling ensured that such measures by government attorneys will limit
the impact of the conviction in subsequent
immigration proceedings.
The Court employed a similar approach
in 0RQFULHƛIHY+ROGHU.39 Adrian Moncrieffe, a long-time lawful permanent resident with two U.S. citizen children, was
stopped for a driving offense in Georgia
and arrested for possessing a small amount
of marijuana. He pleaded guilty as a firsttime offender to possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute. ICE asserted that
Moncreiffe’s conviction triggered the “illicit trafficking” aggravated felony ground
of removal, which categorization would
take equitable discretion away from the
immigration judge.40
In a 7 to 2 decision, the Court rejected the government’s position, creating
space for a discretionary judgment by
an immigration judge about the justifiability of Moncrieffe’s deportation. The
Court again emphasized the categorical
analysis that should be employed to determine the immigration consequences of
criminal convictions. A “state offense is a
categorical match with a generic federal
offense only if a conviction of the state offense necessarily involved . . . facts equat-

Padilla established a structure for
noncitizen defendants to reach plea
deals that avoid deportation, or that
preserve narrow possibilities for
equitable discretionary relief in later
deportation proceedings.

ing to the generic federal offense.”41 The
noncitizen’s actual conduct, the Court explained, is not relevant to the categorical
approach. Instead, courts “must presume
that the conviction rested upon nothing
more than the least of the acts criminalized, and then determine whether even
those acts are encompassed by the generic
federal offense.”42 If the state statute criminalizes conduct that is broader than the
generic federal offense referenced in the
Immigration and Nationality Act, there is
an insufficient match between the offenses to warrant imposition of the relevant
removal ground.
The state conviction at issue in MonFULHƛIH was an insufficient match with the
aggravated felony drug trafficking category because the cross-referenced federal statute captured both felonious sale
and misdemeanor distribution (defined as
social sharing of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration). Although
the government argued that the federal
scheme treated misdemeanor distribution as a sentencing exception, the Court
still found the approach excessive. Some
state-law marijuana distribution convictions would unambiguously correspond
only with federal misdemeanors, involving just a small amount of marijuana and
no remuneration.
The underlying problem was that lawfully present noncitizens whose conduct
was not egregious would find themselves
subject to a mandatory removal category
2017 APRIL
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without any possibility of equitable balancing. The Court concluded its opinion
in 0RQFULHƛIHby chiding the government
for its unduly aggressive approach to the
criminal deportation provisions, especially with respect to the removal of LPRs
with minor criminal history:
This is the third time in seven years
that we have considered whether the
Government has properly characterized a low-level drug offense as “illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance,”
and thus an “aggravated felony.” Once
again we hold that the Government’s
approach defies “the commonsense
conception” of these terms.43
In Mellouli, mentioned at the outset
of this article, the Court similarly rejected the government’s scorched-earth
approach to seeking the deportation of
LPRs with minor drug crimes. Following
an arrest for driving offenses, Moones
Mellouli was detained. After officers discovered four Adderall pills in his sock, the
state charged him with trafficking contraband in jail. A deal was later struck, and
the amended complaint to which Mellouli
pleaded guilty charged only the lesser offense of possessing drug paraphernalia—a
sock—and did not identify the substance
that the officers had seized.44
In another 7-2 decision, authored by
Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that Mellouli’s drug paraphernalia conviction was
not a removable offense. First, the Court
noted that federal law does not criminalize simple possession of drug paraphernalia. In addition, federal law defines
drug paraphernalia, for purposes of nonpossessory crimes such as production or
trafficking, as “any ‘equipment, product,
or material’ which is ‘primarily intended or
designed for use’ in connection with various drug-related activities,” in contrast to
“common household or ready-to-wear
items like socks.”45 Justice Ginsburg also
observed that in 19 states Mellouli’s conduct would not even have been deemed a
criminal offense.
Immigration officials’ theory for Mellouli’s deportability was that “a paraphernalia conviction ‘relates to’ any and all
controlled substances, whether or not fed24
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erally listed, with which the paraphernalia
can be used.”46 The Court, however, again
underscored the necessity of a categorical
approach to analyzing the immigration
consequences of criminal convictions,
emphasizing that the INA’s controlledsubstance ground of removal applies only
to noncitizens actually convicted of laws
relating to the federally controlled substances that are listed in section 802 of
Title 21.47 In particular, the Court was
troubled by the “anomalous result” that
minor paraphernalia offenses could trigger removal more easily than offenses
based on the actual possession or distribution of drugs, since those offenses support
removal only if they necessarily involve a
federally controlled substance.48
Thus, the Court again insisted on a
“categorical approach” when considering
the immigration consequences of criminal
convictions, finding an insufficient match
between the state conviction and the federal removal category in Mellouli’s case.
Notably, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for
the majority endorsed the fact that as a
consequence of the categorical approach,
noncitizens in criminal proceedings might
“enter ‘safe harbor’ guilty pleas” that avoid
immigration sanctions.49 Indeed, Mellouli’s own plea seemed to have been an
instance of this, in light of the deal struck
and the amended complaint’s omission
of the nature of the discovered pills in
Mellouli’s sock. As it had done in Padilla,
then, the Court in Mellouli endorsed the
appropriateness of plea-bargain deals that
help noncitizens avoid removal when significant equities support their continued
residence in the United States.50
Mellouli and the Court’s other recent
crime-based-deportation rulings aim to
inject considerations of individual fairness into the deportation process. Padilla
pushes defense attorneys to seek safe
harbors for their noncitizen clients, and
prosecutors to weigh immigration-law
consequences in exercising their discretion to strike individualized plea deals. At
the same time, decisions like CarachuriRosendo, 0RQFULHƛIHand Mellouli help preserve the effectiveness of such criminal
court deals in downstream removal proceedings, where back-end balancing is
much constrained.

The Limitations and Drawbacks
of Enforcement-Based Equity

To be sure, a deportation system that relies primarily on enforcement discretion
for proportionality and fairness is far
from ideal. One drawback of relying on
enforcement discretion to keep the deportation system normatively justifiable
is that executive actions in this area tend
to arouse significant ire and controversy.
States, congresspersons or members of
the public may not approve of the particular manner in which the DHS manages discretionary enforcement power,
and may attempt to force modifications
through legislation or litigation. We saw
this dynamic at work in the criticism of,
and challenges to, President Obama’s deferred action initiatives. While the Court’s
recognition in Arizona of the necessity of
prosecutorial discretion as a vehicle for
equity in immigration enforcement provides some support for categorical initiatives like DACA, the nature and scale
of such programs complicates questions
about their validity or desirability.
Another limitation is that the implementation of equity through enforcement
discretion often does little more than preserve the status quo. Deferred action and
other forms of prosecutorial discretion
typically do not resolve the underlying issue that triggered the initiation of removal proceedings. An undocumented youth
who receives a reprieve under DACA, for
example, remains without legal status and
in legal limbo.
Finally, under any administration, the
enforcement agency is unlikely to engage
in much equitable balancing for noncitizens with almost any criminal history.
The immigration enforcement arms of
the federal government have consistently
pushed for the broadest and most severe
interpretations of the criminal removal
statutes possible. The Trump Administration has broadened its conception of
targeted “criminal aliens” to include even
those who are arrested but not yet convicted.51 Even President Obama’s DACA
program was foreclosed to anyone with a
“significant misdemeanor,” regardless of
other equities or mitigating factors.52
There are obvious political reasons
for these kinds of enforcement choices.

moval grounds, and restore mechanisms
for adjudicative relief from removal for
both lawfully present and undocumented
noncitizens, the pressure on the Executive to adopt measures that ensure individual deportations remain proportional
and justified would decrease. Until then,
we can expect the Court to keep a steady
diet of deportation cases on its docket,
chipping away at the harshest edges of a
system marked by insufficient formal opportunities for equitable balancing. z
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